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Severelyrepressive  financial  measures  typically  resultin slower  I
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Fl  nanl  Policy and Syottma
For a variety of reasons,  most developing  as between  efficiency  (the inicremental  outputl
countries  intervene  extensively  in financial  capital  ratio) and interest rates-but  little rela-
markets. In the industrial  countries,  interest  tionship  between interest rates  and investment
rates have  been liberalized  in the last two  levels and no relationship  between  interest rates
decades  and restraints  on competition  between  and the current  account.
different  types of financial  institutions  have been  These  relationships  partly reflect  the influ-
relaxed,  but many developing  countries  still set  ence of growth  on profitability  and thus int,'rest
ceilings  on interest rates and spreads  and most  rates-but  there also appears  to be a causal  link
allocate  much (often  between  half and all) of  in the other  direction: interest rates and the de-
formal  credit to "priority"  uses.  gree  of financialization  of savings  flows (in
The impact  of interest rate controls  and  terms  of both flow and stock) affect efficiency
other repressive  financial  policies  on investment,  and growth.
efficiency,  and growth has been  debated for  The average  growth difference  between  the
some time. In this study, Alan Gelb reviews  17  higher-growth  countries  and the 17  lower-
theories  on both sides of the debate and investi-  growth  countries  was 3 percent. About  half of
gates such relationships  using a cross-section  one percentage  point of that difference  might
analysis  of 34 countries  between 1965  and 1985.  have been  due to the differential  of 6 percent in
He divides  this 21-year  period  into two periods,  the real interest rates  of the two groups.
breaking  at the year 1973  to take into account  The evidence  supports  the need for liberal-
the substantial  change  in growth  relationships  ized financial  markets,  Gelb concludes--or at
evident in many countries  from about  that time.  least supports  an argument  against  severe
Real (deposit)  interest  rates in developing  financial  repression.
cour,tries  were lower on average than world  That is not to say that abrupt  liberalization  is
(dollar)  levels, especially  after 1973-despite  desirable  or that certain  interventions  in finan-
these  countries' supposed  status as capital-  cial markets  may not be beneficial-at least until
scarce.  measures  to improve  information,  supervision,
Gelb fnds a significant  positive  correlation  regulation,  and macrostability  have become
between  growth rates and interest  rates as well  effective.
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For a  variety  of reasons,  most  developing  countries  intervene  very
extensively  in financial  markets.  Interest  rates  have  been liberalized  in  the
industrial  countries  over the  last two  decades  and restraints  on competition
between  financial  institutions  of various  types  have  been relaxed. However,
despite  some  moves towards  liberalization  of financial  markets,  many
developing  countries  still  set interest  rate  ceilings  and  spreads,  and  most
-allocate  a high percentage  of formal  credit  (often  between  50%  and 100%)  to
'priority"  uses.
The impact  of such  controls  on the  financial  system  on overall
savings,  investment  and  growth,  has  been debated  for  some time.  This study
investigates  some  cross-section  relationships  between  interest  rates,
inflation,  financial  depth  and  resource  mobilization,  investment,  its
efficiency,  and growth  rates,  across  a sample  of 34 developing  countries  over
a 21  year span.  This is  a more extensive  data  base than  used in  most prior
studies. It tries  to address  the  question:  how  much, if  at all, do broad
financial  variables  seem to  matter,  and if they  do, through  which  channels?
A cross-section  approach  is  used  because  the  regulatory  environment
and  characteristics  of the  financial  system  are  seen as structural  features  of
economic  policy,  and the  focus  is  on broad,  long-term  relationships,  rather
than  on lags  and the  dynamics  of adjustment. Accordingly,  regressions  are
estimated  on simple  averages  of variables  over the  entire  time  period. But
because  of concern  over  the  stability  of certain  important  relationships,  they
are  also  estimated  for  a pooled  sample  of averages  across  two  sub-periods,
1965-73  and 1974-85. The choice  of 1973  as a  break  point  is suggested  by the
large  global  fall in the  ratio  of incremental  output  to investment  which
began  about  that time  and  which  appears  to relate  to factors  other  than
financial  markets.'
Fo?  broad,  long-run  relationships,  it is  especially  difficult  to
infer  causal  chains  from  statistical  relationships,  and this  is  a serious
problem  for  studies  of the  present  topic. In virtually  all  previous  studies
1 For discussions  of this deterioration  in the efficiency  of investment,  see
Fischer,  1988,  Bruno  and Sachs,  1985,  Gelb,  1988.2
involving  interest  rate  policy,  the interest  rate  regime  (which  is taken  as a
simple  proxy  for  the  degree  of financial  repression)  is invariably  taken  as
exogenous. But, as discussed  below,  it is  very  unlikely  that  real interest
rate  Roligies  can  be considered  as exogenous  even if  rates  are controlled
rather  than  market-determined.  Feedbacks  should  be expected  from  natural
growth  rates  to  acceptable  interest  rate levels,  and these  should  cause  an
upward  bias in the  coefficients  of any  simple  reduced-form  relationship
between  interest  rates  and  growth. For  this reason,  any such  relationships
should  be interpreted  with caution.
The  next section  briomfly  reviews  theoretical  arguments  in favor  of
market-determined  financial  policies  and  against  them,  and the  endogeneity  of
interest  rates.  Section  3 summarizes  some  related  studies. Section  4
outlines  the  data  base,  and  discusses  some  cross-country  averages. Section  5
reports  on results,  and attempts  to  estimate  some causal  chains. Conclusions
are in Section  6.
2. Financial  Markets.  Efficiene!  and  Growth:  Some  Theories
2.1  ArgUMents  r Liberalized  Finwaiical  Markat;
At least  since  the seminal  works  of McKinnon,  1973,  and  Shaw,  1973,
the  relationship  between  the  financialization  of economic  activity,  financial
sector  policies  and  economic  performance  has  been debated. Before  these
studies,  financial  assets  were commonly  held to  be competitive  with real
assets,  because  savers  could  hold  wealth  in either  form.  This  argued  for
repressing  the returns  on financial  assets,  to encourage  capital  formation  and
growth. However,  this  view,  which  also finds  an echo in  Keynesian  theory,
neglects  the  other  side  of the  balance  sheet  of those  entities  with financial
liabilities. If they  are to  remain  solvent,  they  must invest  the
corresponding  resources  in  real  assets  yielding  at least  as much as they  pay
on their  liabilities. It also  skates  over the  problem  that  savings  might  be
diverted  into foreign  assets,  gold,  consumer  durables  and land  rather  thanr
into  domestic  capital  formation.
Repressing  the  returns  on financial  assets,  either  through
inflationary  confiscation  of real  money  holdings  or through  holding  int-erest
rates  at below-market-clearing  levels,  is  now  quite  widely  held to  affect
growth  negatively  through  two  main  channels:
(1)  The first  involves  the  use  of resources  derived  from the  sale  of
financial  assets  to fund  productive  real  assets--either  fixed  or working
capital--and  therefore  with  capital  formation  and the  level  of capacity  use.
From  the  perspective  of households,  the  ultimate  net savers  in  most economies,
financial  assets  are  substitutable  with fixed  assets  of other  kinds,3
especially  consumer  durables  and  real  property,  notably  land. Alternatively,
foreign  and  domestic  financial  assets  might  substitute,  with financial
repression  causing  capital  flight;  either  way, domestic  investment  is
reduced. 2 If substitution  effects  dominate  in  households'  choice  functions,
repressing  returns  on financial  assets  could  also raise  consumption.  Real
interest  rates  held well  below  market  clearing  levels  therefore  reduce
productive  capital  formation.
(2)  The second  channel--capital  market  fragmentation--involves  the
constraining  of investment  opportunities  by the  possibilities  of self-finance.
Fragmentation  may be on an agent-by  agent  basis,  between  savings  surplus  and
savings  deficit  units.  In addition,  the  absence  of an asset with reasonable
liquidity  attributes  and capable  of providing  a store  of value  prevents
period-by-period  budget  constraints  from  being  replaced  by a single  longer-run
intertemporal  constraint. If there  are scale  economies  in investments,  this
may  prevent  investments  from  being  made  at their  appropriate  scale,  because
there  is  no efficient  way of accumulating  saving  for  sustained  periods  to make
lumpy--and  productive--investments.  In addition,  rationing  schemes  introduced
to allocate  the  limitad  volume  of formal  credit  usually  direct  funds  to less
productive  uses in repressed  systems. The  outcome  is slower  growth,  and
perhaps  also  a deterioration  in the  quality  of the  portfolio  of financial
intermediaries.  The latter  are less  accountable  for  their  lending  decisions
and  have fewer  incentives  and less  scope  for screening  borrowers  according  to
risk.  Suc.i  deterioration  of loan  procedures  is  evident  in  many cases.
Thus,  the  availability  of a limited  volume  of low-cost  funds  can
result  in  poor-quality  projects,  especially  those  financed  by formal  lenders;
Meanwhile,  interest  rates  in the  informal  sector  remain  far  higher,  squeezing
out  better  investments. In  addition,  substantially  negative  real interest
rates  ir.  the  formal  sector  can  bias choice  of technique  against  labor-using
activities  which  further  reduces  the  efficiency  of investment,  especially  for
larger  projects. And the  absence  of financial  contracts  which  offer  a wide
spectrum  of risk-return  characteristics,  a situation  which is  common  in
repressed  systems,  further  constrains  choice  and lowers  efficiency. For
example,  such  systems  fail  to provide  facilities  to firms  to hedge  against
2 Interestingly,  McKinnon,  1973,  considers  manufactured  products  as the main
alternative  to financial  assets,  despite  the dominant  role of property,  and,
especially  land, in household  portfolios  in most developing  countries.  This
choice  leads  him  to  select  the  wholesale  price  index  as  the  measure  of  inflation,
whereas  consideration  of  property  might  suggest  a  different  index. Considering
foreign  assets  would suggest  another index involving  the exchange  rate: low
returns  on financial  assets  have  encouraged  capital  flight  from  many countries,
nctably  in  Latin  America  where  Deppler  and  Williamson,  1987,  estimated  cumulative
capital  outflows  at $107  billion  in 1975-85.4
interest  rate  or foreign  exchange  risk,  or to  share  the  risks  of large
projects. This may  be especially  problematical  in  developing  economies  which
are  typically  more volatile  than industrial  countries.
All of these  reasons  argue  that:
"Whether  the  authorities  decided  to  nourish  and  expand  the "real"
stock  of money...or  allow  it to remain  shrunken  and  heavily  taxed,  has
critically  affected  the relation  between  savings  and income  and  the efficiency
of investment  in a number  of countries.."
McKinnon,  1973,  pp. 3.
2.2  Arggmnts for  Regressed  or Directed  FinanCial  Markets
Against  these  points,  a number  of arguments  can  be made to the
effect  that  an inflationary  process  and  measures  to reduce  interest  charges
can  be beneficial  to sustained  growth. According  to some theories  of income
distribution,  inflation  redistributes  wage income  from low-saving  workers  to
high-saving  owners  of capital  and  this  can raise  growth. 3 Some  argue  that the
promotion  of high  priority  "productive"  investment,  with longer  gestation
periods  and  possible  externalities,  justifies  suppressing  their  financial
costs  and so lowering  their  cost of capital. Another,  "structuralist"  view
argues  that  higher  interest  rates  on  working  capital  are,  anyway,  simply
passed  through  into  costs  and  prices  and  hence  are themselves  inflationary.4
In addition,  times  of economic  crisis,  which  reduce  the  real  value  of much
fixed  capital,  are  often  markad  by accelerating  inflation. A common  response
of governments  is to attempt  to  protect  equity-holders  from  cash-flow
problems,  or from the  erosion  of net  worth (due  to the  crisis),  by holding
interest  rates  below  inflation. Such  cunsiderations,  together  with the
ethical  aversion  to interest  which is  prevalent  in  many  major  value  systems,
have influenced  interest  rate  policies  in  many developing  and industrialized
3 This "Cambridge"  savings  function,  and  the  macroeconomic  closing  rules  which
follow  from  it,  are  discussed  by Taylor,  1986.
4 For  a model  of Korea  with these  characteristics  see  van  Wijnbergen,  1985.5
countries  .5
The  wisdom  of financial  libezalization  has  also  been questioned
following  the  results  of sudden  decontrol  in the  Southern  Cone  couatries.6
A more recent  argument  in favor  of interest  rate  controls  derives
from  the  work of Stiglitz  and  Weiss,  1981.  Financial  markets  are  unlike
"real"  markets  in that information  imparfections  are  far  more important. In
this  situation,  the  interest  rate  which  a borrower  is ready  to pay is  more
than  a "price";  it is also  a signal  of the  riskiness  of the  venture (with
limited  liability,  the  probability  of not  having  to repay  the  loan rises  with
the  degree  of risk  and  so does the  expected  return  to the  borrower,  assuming
constant  expected  returns  to the  project). The degree  of debt  finance  also
biases  the  borrower  towards  more risky  investments.  Under these  conditions,
it  may  be shown  that  a market  based financial  system  could  ration  credit  away
from  the  most  productive  borrowers. This,  in turn,  could  reduce  the
efficiency  of the  economy  relative  to a situation  where  credit  is  directed
through  financial  intermediaries  (development  or commercial  banks)  even if the
latter  make  a  loss.
7
2.3  Portfolio  lity. Distortions and  enomic  Efficienc
Interest  ceilings  and restraints  on competition  between  financial
institutions  are also  sometimes  imposed  for  prudential  reasons. There  is some
5 Long-standing  usury laws have sometimes  been at the origin  of regulations
setting  interest  rate  ceilings,  for  example,  on  rural  credit  in  Brazil. Sometimes
they  can  be approached  through  changing  the  form  of financial  contract;  thus  the
Islamization  of  banking  in  Pakistan  resulted  in  more  flexible  returns  to  financial
asset-holders.  Usury  laws  sought  to  prevent  unanticipated  wealth  transfers  from
poor  to  rich.  These  can  result  from  a  lender  with  some  monopoly  power  systematically
undervaluitig  collateral  and  imposing  high,  and  eventually  unsustainable,  interest
burdens on  the  borrower.  In pre-industrial  societies without financial
intermediaries  and  with rich lenders  and  poor  borrowers  tied also  by a variety
of  feudal  controls  and  with the  borrower's  body  as  ultimate  collateral  (serfdom,
slavery)  these  concerns  may  have  considerable  validity. In  modern  financialised
economies  the  distributional  effects  of low interest  rate ceilings  are likely
to  be the  opposite. The  poor  are  more likely  to be small  financial  savers  and
the  rich (the  only  ones  with  collateral  since  the  demise  of  chattel  slavery)  are
the  dominant  borrowers. Ethical  systems  have not  kept  pace with the  evolution
of economic  institutions.
6  Corbo  and  de  Melo,  1985,  Diaz-Alejandro,  1985. McKinnon,  1988,  compares  these
episodes  with more  measured  decontrol  in  Asian  countries.
7 This  argument  is in Cho,  1986.6
evidence  from the  US that restraint  can  reduce  risk-taking,  but this  is not  an
argument  for interest  rates  held far  below  market  levels  or for  extensive
regulations  on credit  allocation.8
The relationship  between  financial  saving  and real  capital
formation  is  made more complex  by the  possibility  of financial  distress. The
use  made  of borrowed  resources  is an important  question  in the  developing
country  context,  not only for  the  government  (which  is usually  a  major
borrower),  but also for  debt issued  by the  private  sector.  One factor  is the
use  made  by government  of the  resources  which it  can generate  by issuing
liabilities. Government  ought  to  be able to counter  a strong  preference  for
financial  assets  by the  private  sector  by issuing  paper  and  using  the  proceeds
to fund  productive  investments,  but it  may also  borrow  to finance  unproductive
spending. 9 Because  of the  general  weakness  of portfolio  audits  and
correspondingly  poor information  on the  financial  condition  of intermediaries
and  debtors,  the  private  sector  may  do the  same.  Resources  raised  by
borrowing  may then  go to support  consumption  or  poor investments,  and  yet  the
holders  of the  corresponding  financial  assets  will  view their  claims  as net
wealth.  It is therefore  conceivable  that  for  rather  short  periods  financial
deepening  proceeds  apace  with declining  real  investment  or unproductive
capital  formation.
In the  end, of course,  such  a process  will collapse. If government
borrowing  was excessive,  the  collapse  will involve  a fiscal  crisis  and
inflation  provoked  by rising  government  debt service  costs  which  are
unsustainable  in the  face  of low  output  and  fiscal  revenue  growth. 10
Alternatively,  there  may  be a financial  crisis  involving  widespread  insolvency
of private  borrowers  and intermediaries.  The  recent  experience  of many
developing  countries  and the  prevalence  of distress  borrowing  at escalating
real interest  rates  suggests  that  this  process  of financial  asset  values
becoming  "unlinked"  from the  underlying  value  of real  assets  is  not too
unusual."
8 Increased  competition  and  the  phasing  out  of  protected  markets  for  banks  have
been  partly  responsible  for the  substantial  increase  in the  losses  of US banks
since  the  1950s:  see  Silverberg,  1989.
9 The alternative,  to accumulate  foreign  resenres,  is illustrated  by the case
of Botswana,  where  the  government  acts  as deposit-taker  of the  last resort  and
had accumulated  reserves  equivalent  to 23 months'  imports  by 1988.
10  Brazil  in 1984  and  Mexico  in the  mid-1980s  appear  to  have  been close  to this
point.  Sargent  and  Wallace,  1981,  analyse  the  infIationary  potential  of  excessive
debt issue.
11 For discussion  of financial  distress  and crisis,  see Hinds, 1988,  Atiyas,
1989.  The corollary  to this  argument  is that financial  liberalization  should
be preceded  by, or be accompanied  by, reform of prudential regulation  and
supervision.7
Combining  the  distress  borrowing  phenomenon  at  high interest  rates
with the  portfolio  problems  noted  above  which  often  emerge  when lending  is
highly  directed,  suggests  a relationship  between  portfolio  quality  and the
level  of returns  on financial  assets  as shown  in Figure  1.  For  a  given
economy,'the  interest  rate at  point  A corresponds  to  a market-determined
level,  assuming  effective  prudential  supervision  and regulation. Points  to
the  left  of A correspond  to repressed  systems,  with severe  distortions  in
credit  allocation,  little  freedom  for  banks  to select  creditworthy  borrowers
and  weakened  portfolios. 1 2 Points  well to the  right  of A involve  interest
rates  far  above  the  returns  on investment,  and are  sustained  essentially  as
Ponzi  schemes.
Another  way in  which real  and  financial  asset  values  can  become
unlinked  is through  distortionary  taxation. Debt  may be sought,  not to
finance  good investments,  but  because  it  gives  rise  to large  tax  write-offs.
One such  case occurs  when inflation  is  high  and  nominal  interest  payments  are
deductible  as costs  from  pretax  profits. 13 Alternatively,  one sector,  such  as
industry,  may  be heavily  and  unjustifiably  protected  relative  to another
(agriculture),  so that the  impact  on growth  and efficiency  of a rural
financial  system  which sinhons  off  rural  savings  to urban  areas is  negative.
Nevertheless,  most analyses  abstract  from  distress  borrowing
effects,  taxation  and  second-best  concerns,  and assume  that  on the  opposite
side of the  balance  sheet  to a financial  liabil.ty  is a real asset  with
productivity  set  by the  need to service  debt fully.
2.4  The  Endoaeneity  of Real  IntereAt-Rate
There  are  powerful  forces  making  for  the  endogeneity  of returns  to
financial  assets  with respect  to the  rate  of economic  growth:
12 To the left  of A, as financial  markets  are  more and  more repressed  and the
supply  of  loanable  funds  shrir,cs,  it  is  assumed  that  lending  becomes  more  heavily
directed.  In  these  conditions,  prudential  supervision  and  regulation  concentrates
on fulfillment  of rules  rather  than  portfolio  quality,  and  banks,  with little
lending  discretion  anyway,  have  less interest  in the  creditworthiness  of their
clients.
13 A recent  study  of this effect  for  Colombia  confirms  the substantial  impact
of eliminating  such deductability  of the inflationary  component  of interest
payments  on the  cost of capital:  Dailami,  1989.  In principle,  an offsetting
effect  of tax  changes  might  come  on the  savings  side,  but in  practice  taxes  are
often  avoided  on interest  receipts,  so that the tax system  confers  a subsidy
wedge via debt.  In China, amortisation  of principle is also deductible,  a
substantial  incentive  to acquire  debt.8
1.  Wealth  portfolios  include  capital  goods,  financial  assets  and  other
assets,  notably  real  estate  and land.  Large  real  inc'eases  in property
prices--spurred  perhaps  by repressing  returns  on other  assets--may  indeed
impact  adversely  on domestic  savings  rates,  essentially  because  of consumption
out  of capital  gains;  see  Tobin,  1966.14  This introduces  a relationship
between  interest  rates,  savings  and investment  (as  measured  in the  national
accounts)  and  growth. But  another  "stylized  fact"  of development  is that,
over  the long  term,  real  prices  of fixed  factors  such  as land  also tend to
increase  at least  as rapidly  as the  rate  of economic  growth  and sometimes  more
rapidly.  Such  a process  can  be represented  in  a Cobb-Douglas  or CES  growth
model  with land  entering  into  production  and  fixed  in total  quantity:  land
rent  then represents  a constant  or rising  percentage  of GDP.  This suggests
that,  in a rapidly  growing  economy,  interest  rates  would  need to  be higher  for
financial  assets  to compete  wit  land  and real  estate  in  wealth  portfolios
than  in one  which  grew slowly  for  otner  reasons.
2.  Growth  models  provide  further  arguments  for  the  long-run
endogeneity  of the interest  rate. Abstracting  from the  additional  liquidity
and convenience  attributes  of financial  assets  (and  from  distress  borrowing),
their  return  should  be closely  related  to the rate  of profit  from  owning
physical  capital. Over a range  of growth  models,  the  steady-state  growth
model  which  maximizes  consumption  per  head (the  "golden  rule")  is
characterized  by the  identity  of the  rates  of growth  and  profit;  for
discussion,  see  Hahn and  Matthews,  1969.  This  holds  regardless  of the  number
of commodities  in the  model  and the  savings  assumptions  made,  and a similar
feature  is characteristic  of more  recent  optimum  growth  models. Higher  growth
would  therefore  be expected  to  be reflected  in  higher  interest  rates  and,
given  the  extra  convenience  and  liquidity  yields  of financial  assets,  a
situation  where interest  rates  on these  exceeded  growth  rates  would  probably
be unsustainable  over the  long  run.
Economies  with favorable  preconditions  for  growth  (including  other
aspects  of the  policy  framework  such  as the  trade  regime)  will therefore  tend
to have  higher  profit  and interest  rates. This,  indeed,  is the  mechanism
which  would  be expected  to reallocate  global  fina  *Na towards  the  more  rapidly
growing  economies. Rapidly  growing  economies  would,  on this  view,  tend to run
14 For one example of the relationship  between cheap  credit  availability  and
real  land  prices  see  World  Bank,  1985,  pp.  126-127.  The  impact  of  higher  capital
gains  on  residential  property  on  falliT.g  levels  of  household  savings  in  the  early
I970s was a concern  for  the  US in the  1970s.  See  also  Summers,  1981.
On  the  other  hand,  the  relationship  between  property  prices  and  financial  resource
mobilization  may  itself  depend  on  financial  market  structure.  If  mortgage  finance
is not  easily  available,  it is sometimes  argued  (as  in the  case of Japan)  that
increasing  property  prices  may stimulate  savings  towards  downpayments  for the
purchase  of property.9
larger  international  deficits  than  slow-growing  ones,  where  rates  of profit
are  low  and this  constrains  the  sustainable  level  of long-term  rates.
Slow-growing  economies  would  be expected  to  need periodic  episodes  of debt
relief,  for  example,  through  inflating  and  holding  interest  rates  below  price
level  increases,  to  restore  profits  and  growth. This  may  lower  financial
savings,  yet spur  growth:
"[M]ere  abstinence  is  not  enough  by itself...It  is  enterprise  which
builds  and improves  t'ne  world's  possessions..  .Thrift  may  be the  handmaid  and
nurse  of enterprise. Bu.  equally,  she  may  not....For  enterprise  is  connected
with thrift  not directly  but at one remove;  and  the link  which should  join
them  is frequently  missing.  For  the  engine  which  drives  Enterprise  is not
Thrift  but Profit.
Keynes,  1930,  pp.  148-149.
A view that  departs  from the  assumption  that  developing  country
rates  are exogenously  administered,  would  imply  that low-interest  countries
wit-h  rationed  credit  and lending  out  of scarce  domestic  resources,  would  tend
to run the  largest  foreign  deficits. In  contrast,  a market-driven  view
suggests  that  foreign  finance  is attracted  by higher  yields  and  growth.
Figure  2  depicts  these  different  cases. Reality  may  be a  blend  of the two
extremes,  with one  effect  dominating  for  a range  of countries  where interest
rates  are  more  market-determined  and the  other  dominant  for  a number  of
seriously  repressed  countries.
In a further  complication,  slow  growth  is  not  necessarily
indicative  of a low  marginal  product  of investment. Existing  capital  stocks
may  have been rendered  obsolete  by large  relative  price  changes,  such  as that
for  energy,  but there  may  be high returns  to  new investments. In this
situation,  high interest  rates  will support  structural  change  and,  from the
perspective  of adjustment  at the  margin,  will  be helpful. However,  they  might
also  provoke  widespread  bankruptcies  of existing  firms,  and this  may make
government  reluctant  to pursue  a tight  monetary  policy.
For  all  the  above  reasons,  simple  relationships  between  interest
rates  and  growth  rates,  such  as have  been found  in  a number  of studies,  must
be treated  with caution. The level  of returns  which  a fast-growing  country,
such as  Korea,  is able  to sustain  without  distress  borrowing  probably  far
exceeds  the  corresponding  level  in  a country  such as  Argentina,  where  the
growth  process  has  been impeded  by a variety  of political  factors  and the
general  thrust  of economic  policy  as  well as its  notable  lack  of stability.
Liberalizing  returns  on financial  assets,  while  maintaining  asset  quality
through  improved  prudential  supervision  and  regulation,  might  be a major  step
forward,  but it  would  not transform  an Argentina  into  a Korea.10
3. Sam  Ruyipt4n&  StudLmm
In putting  forth  his theory,  MScIinnon.  1973,  investigated  a number
of interactions  between  the  size  of the  financial  sector  (expressed,  for
example,  relative  to  GDP) and rates  of output  growth  for  specific  phases  in
the  development  of eight  countries,  using  a  case-study  approach.  He
concluded  that  periods  of  high growth  were associated  with expansion,  or
recovery,  of real  monetary  aggregates,  and that  it  was  within  the  capabilities
of fiscal,  monetary  and interest  rate  policies  to  promote  such expansion.
Further,  at least  if inflation  is  moderate,  a policy  of  high interest  rates
could  offset  much  of the  adverse  effect  on financial  aggregates. These
results  should,  of course,  be interpreted  as applying  to countries  on the left
of A in Figure  1.
McKinnon's  empirical  work offered  only limited  statistical  support
for  his  hypotheses.15 Later  studies  have  estimated  relationships  between
growth  and  financial  policies  for  a wider  selection  of countries  and time
periods. This section  briefly  reviews  a few  of the  most relevant  studies.
Fry 1.278,  tests  the  McKinnon-Shaw  hypotheses  that financial  market
conditions  do influence  saving  and  growth  rates,  using  data for 7  Asian
countries  over 7-11  year  periods,  and  estimating  with pooled  time-series
cross-section  data  and  country  dummy  variables. The real  interest  rate  was
found  to  exert  a significant  influence  on domestic  savings,  and  also  on rates
of growth. In a second  paper,  Fry  19fi80,  estimates  the  cost of financial
repression  using  a  thrre-equation  model  based  on savings  and growth  functions
estimated  on a similar  data set. He concludes  that  the  cost  of financial
repression  appears  to be around  half a percentage  point in  economic  growth
foregone  for  every  one  percentage  point  by which  the  real  deposit  rate is
below  a market  equilibrium  rate.  A pooled  time-series  cross-section  study  of
the  interdependence  of saving,  investment  and  growth  for  61 countries  over an
average  of 11  years (without  including  the interest  rate in the  analysis)
indicates  that  growth,  income  per  head,  terms  of trade,  relative  size  of the
mining  sector  and lagged  savings  rates  affect  savings  positively,  while
foreign  savings  and the  predictability  of inflation  from  a three-year  trend
reduce  it.  Investment  rates  respond  to  output  growth,  terms  of trade,
"unexpected"  inflation,  lagged  investment,  domestic  credit  availability
relative  to  GDP and  changes  in this  ratio. The latter  two  variables  can  be
considered  as  proxies  for  the  influence  of interest  rate  policies  and/or
inflation  rates  which  affect  the  holding  of real  financial  assets  and thus
determine  the  availability  of credit.
15 In addition  to the  number  of countries  and  periods  being small,  these  were
chosen  to include  episodes  of wide-ranging  economic  reform  of which financial
sector  reforms  comprised  only  one component.11
Using  a sample  of 21 countries,  a study  by the  International
Monetary  Fund.  1983,  analyses  the  cross-section  relationship  between  average
real interest  rates,  GDP growth  and growth  of broad  money  over the  decade
41971-80.  As expected,  tthere  is  a close  relationship  between  output  and  money
growth,  but, as output  growth  would  be expected  to promote  growth  of financial
assets  just as the latter  might  raise  output  growth,  causation  is  not clear.
However,  the  paper  also finds  significant  association  between  the  real
interest  rate regime  and the  growth  of output  and  money,  where  the interest
rate  regime  is a dummy  variable,  taking  the  values  1, 0 and -1,  depending  on
whether  the  average  real interest  rate  were  positive,  slightly  negative  or
strongly  negative  over  the  period. Under  the  assumption  that  the interest
rate  regime  so defined  represents  an exogenouse  policy  variable,  this  suggests
that  output  growth  rates  are indeed  influenced  by interest  rate  policies,  in
the  direction  suggested  by McKinnon  and  Shaw.  The  paper  does  not  address  the
question  of the  transmission  mechanism  between  interest  rates  and growth  in
more detail;  neither  does it  directly  consider  the  role of interest  rate
policy  as opposed  to inflation.
Using  a sample  of 31  developing  countries,  AgArvala.  1983,  examines
the relationship  between  two  performance  variables,  growth  and  equity,  and
seven  distortions  in  product,  factor  and foreign  exchange  markats  for the
decade  of the  1970s. The level  of real  interest  rates  was included  as one  of
the  seven  distortions. Only a  weak relationship  was found  between  interest
rates  and growth.  but this  may  have been due  to the  ranges  chosen  to classify
the  countries:  only  two  were classified  as having  low interest  rate
distortions. A composite  distortion  index,  formed  by arithmetic  averaging  of
the  seven  distortions,  explains  34%  of the  cross-country  variation  in growth
rates.
Hanson  and  Neal,  1987,  estimate  the  demand  for  broadly  defined
money,  estimating  a  partial  adjustment  model  of asset  demand  for  36 countries
over  periods  of approximately  20 years.  Inflation  was a powerful  determinant
of financial  asset  holdings,  while  nominal  term  deposit  rates,  though
generally  positive  in impact,  had a less clearly  identifiable  role.  Part  of
the  reason  for  this  may  have  been that  nominal  rates  were typically
administered,  and  adjusted  too  little  and too  late  to compensate  for inflation
and other  corrosive  influences. In fact  cross-section  regression  of the
average  nominal  interest  rate  on average  inflation  showed  that rates  were
adjusted  by only 65%  of inflation,  so that  the  more inflationary  countries
typically  had lower  real interest  rates. Cross-section  regressions  of
financial  asset  holding  that included  as explanatory  variables  both average
inflation  and the  average  nominal  interest  rate  produced  a negative,  though
insignificant,  sign for  the latter,  probably  because  of this
interrelationship.  Although  the  study  did  not go on to investigate  the
consequences  of financial  repression,  it raises  the  question  of whether  the
emphasis  should  be on interest  rate  policies  or on the  fiscal,  monetary  and12
other  policies  which  affect  the  inflation  rate,  when considering  financial
disintermediation.  Is any  observed  cross-section  relationship  between  real
interest  rates,  efficiency  and growth  simply  due to the  negative  correlation
between  real interest  rates  and inflation,  and the  impact  of the  latter? Or,
given  the  importance  of the  means  of payment  Ml relative  to quasi  money in the
financial  systems  of  most developing  countries,  is it realistic  to expect  a
large  role  for interest  rate  policies  in the  face  of  high and  volatile
inflation  rates? These  issues  are further  investigated  by Neal.  1989's  study
of the  determinants  of financial  depth  in 117  countries  for  1985.
Thatkhate.  1288,  tests  cross-country  relationships  between  economic
variables  such  as growth  and investment  and the  level  of interest  rates  for  a
-sample  of 64 LDCs  during  the  period  1971-80  using  a  nonparametric  Mann-Whitney
test. No statistically  significant  difference  was found  between  countries
above  and  those  below  the  mean real interest  rate.  The study  concluded  that
the  interest  rate level  itself  had little  or  no impact  on macroeconomic
variables,  at least  when considered  in isolation  from  other  policy
variables  .16
Fry,  1988  and  Gonzalez  Arrieta.  1988,  summarize  existing  studies  in
this  area.  While  the former  is inclined  to support  a positive  association,
the latter  argues  that the  evidence  is far  from  clear.  In  our  view,  despite
considerable  doubt  on the  extent  to  which  liberalized  interest  rate  or
financial  sector  policies  can, on their  own, contribute  to efficiency  and
growth,  the  weight  of evidence  of the  above  and similar  studies  supports  a
positive  association. No known  studies  present  strong  evidence  in favor  of
repressing  financial  systems.
4. Some  Cross-Section  Relationships  for  34 Countries
4.1  Data.
The  data  base for the  present  study  covers  34 countries  over  a
period  of 21 years,  1965-85. The  countries  chosen  are in the  Hanson-Neal,
1987,  data set  and  the interest  rate  data  are  based  on their  study  which  tried
to inelude  only  countries  with  meaningful  interest  rates.  The interest  rates
are  generally  rates  on deposits  of around  3-6  months. These  are complemented
by data  on output  and  population  growth,  investment  and  savings  rates,  narrow
and  broad  money  aggregates,  current  account  and 1975  income  per  head, from
Interational Financial  Statistics  World  Bank sources  and, in some  cases,
16  The difference  between  the  high and  the  low-interest  rate  country  groups  'n
this  study is  only 3.5%,  so that  much of any  statistical  power in the "tails"
of  the  distribution  is  eliminated.  Also,  the  rank  ordering  between  real  interest
rates, growth and incremental  capital-output  ratios is as predicted  by the
McKinnon-Shaw  view.  The  results  of the  study  are  therefore  not  so  much  against
this  view as providing  little  support.13
country  sources.  All time-averaging  is  done  by taking  simple  averages  of
annual  variables,  rates  or ratios. All  real interest  rates  are  ost,  that
is,  deflated  by inflation  over the  same  year.
For 11 of the  countries  it is  also  possible  to obtain  local  stock
market  price indices  from the  IFC  data  base for  an average  of 8 years  up to
1985,  and  these  are also included  in the  data  base.  -
Figure  3 shows  the  average  real interest  rate for  the 34 countries
relative  to the  rate on real 3-month  US T-Bills  for  the  period  1965-85. Real
rates  in the  developing  countries  have usually  been  below the  real  T-Bill  rate
by a considerable  margin,  and this  widened  in the  second  half of the  period.
US interest  rates  rose after  1979,  and  rates  in  many developing  countries
increased  sharply  but fell  behind  accelerating  inflation  after  1971.  Only  by
1985  were there  signs  that  the  average  rate in  developing  countries  was
approaching  the  US rate.  The  mean real  rate  for the  34 countries  declined
from -2%  over 1965-73  to -5%  in 1973-85. But the  median  fell less  sharply,
from -1%  to -2%  because  rates  declined  precipitously  in a few  countries.
Some  of the  changes  in averages  between  these  two  periods  are
indicated  in  Tables  la to ld.  Table  la includes  the  whole  sample. Table  lb
shows  cross-country  averages  for the  higher  and  lower-growers  over the  whole
period. Table  lc shows  averages  for  the  higher-growing  halves  of the  sample
in the two  sub-periods,  and  Table  ld  averages  for  the lower-growing  halves.
Table la shows  that  after  1973,  although  investment  rates  increased
from  21%  to 24%  of GDP,  performance  deteriorated  sharply. The average
incremental  output-capital  ratio  (IOCR)  fell  by over 50%, and  growth  slumped
from  6% to only 3.6%.  Inflation  soared  from 18%  to 34%,  and the  mean real
interest  rate fell  from -2%  to -5%. Nevertheless,  as countries  continued  to
develop  and financialise,  the  mean ratio  of M3 to  GDP rose from  28% to 35%.
The  Tables  also  show a notable  increase  in the  cross-country  variability  of
performance  in the  second  period. The gap  between  good and  poor  performers
widened,  especially  for  inflation  (which  rose  little  for  the  high growers).
Tables  lc and  ld show  large  differences  in the  level  of real interest  rates
between  the  higher  and lower-growth  countries,  and that  these  widened  in the
second  period. Before  1973,  nominal  interest  rates  in the  high-growth
countries  equalled  inflation  and in the  low  growers  real rates  were negative
4%; after  1973  these  real rates  fell to -1%  and -9%  respectively. For  the
overall  period,  the  low  growers'  real  rates  were 6 percentage  points  below
those  of the  high growers  and their  ratio  of M3/GDP  was one third  lower;  their
investment  rate  was somewhat  lower  (19%  versus  26%  of GDP) and  their
efficiency  of investment  (as  measured  by the  IOCR)  only 16%  as opposed  to 27%.14
Tables  la -Id  also  show  averages  for  two  other  variables, RFSTS
indicates  the  ratio  of increases  in real  broad  money  balances  to savings
(Ratio  of Financial  Savings  to  Total  Savings);  it  will  be discussed  further
below,  but it should  be noted  that  RFSTS  is lower  for  the  slow growers,
especially  after 1973. An index  of the  volatility  of inflation  is constructed
as the  average  absolute  deviation  of inflation  from its  value of the  previous
year.  Volatility  rose somewhat  after  1973  for  the  sample  as a whole,  and  was
nearly  twice  as large  for  the low  growers  as shown  in  Table lb.  This  raises
the  question  Qf  whether  deteriorated  performance  can  be attributed  to such
instability,  rather  than  just  to the  levels  of inflation,  interest  rates,
investment  and so on.17
17 The increased  uncertainty  of the global  economy appears to have been an
important  factor  in  the  poor  performance  of  the  oil  exporting  developing  countries:
see  Gelb, 1988,  and the  changes  in energy  prices,  which relate  to volatility,
are  assigned  a  considerable  weight  in  explaining  the  OECD  productivity  slow-down:
Fischer,  1988.15
Tabh  la
Cross-Country Averages; /All  Countries: for 1965-73 and 1974-85
Period  Early  Late
Mean  Std Dev  Mean  Std Dev
GDP growth  . , .03  .04  .03
Real Int Rate  -.02  .07  -.05  .08
IncOut/CapRatio  .32  .13  .14  .12
Invest Rate  .21  .06  .24  .08
Inflation  .18  .34  .34  .47
M3/GDP  .28  .15  .35  .18
RFSTS 18 .14  .10  .07  .13
Volatility 19 .13  .28  .16  .23
Cross-Country Averages for Overall Period 1965-85
High Growth Countries  Low Growth Countries
Mean  Std Dev  Mean  Std Dev
GDP growth  .06  .02  .03  .01
Real Int Rate  -.01  .04  -.07  .06
IncOut/CapRatio  .27  .08  .16  .07
Invest Rate  .26  .07  .19  .05
Inflation  .20  .23  .34  .41
M3/GDP  .39  .20  .26  .07
RFSTS  .15  .09  .05  .07
Volatility  .10  .16  .19  .21
18 RFSTS measures the extent to which savings flows are reflected in increases
in real  broad  money,  and  thus the  extent  to which  they can  be  said  to be
"financialized."  It is defined below.
19  Volatility is  measured by the  absolute deviation of inflation  rates from their
previous year's lev3l.16
Tiahl  1 rC
Cross-Country  Averages:  High  Growth  Countries:  for 1965-73  and  1974-85
Period  Early  Late
Mean  Std  Dev  Mean  Std  Dev
GDP growth  - .08  .02  .06  .01
Real Int  Rate  .00  .06  -.01  .04
IncOut/CapRatio  .39  .12  .22  .06
Invest  Rate  .22  .07  .27  .07
Inflation  .19  .41  .20  .23
M3/GDP  .31  .18  .42  .20
RFSIS  .16  .10  .15  .13
Volatility  .10  .36  .08  .05
Cross-Country  Averages:  Low  Growth  Countries:  for 1965-73  and 1974-85
Period  Early  Late
Mean  Std  Dev  Mean  Std  Dev
GDP  growth  .04  .01  .01  .02
Real Int Rate  -.04  .08  -.09  .09
IncOut/CapRatio  .24  .10  .07  .13
Invest  Rate  .19  .06  .21  .08
Inflation  .17  .26  .48  .60
M3/GDP  .25  .09  .28  .13
RFSTS  .12  .10  .00  .09
Volatility  .12  .18  .23  .3017
Another  feature  of the  data is the  degree  to which  the  performance
of individual  countries  differs  between  the two  sub-periods. The  R2 adjusted
for  degrees  of freedom  (RSqAdj)  for  the  real interest  rate (RR)  between  early
and  late  periods  is only  0.09.20  For  other  variables,  such  as GDP growth,  the
IOCR,  and  RFSTS  they  are  also  very low (RsqAdj  ranges  from -0.02  to 0.26),  so
that  the  experience  of countries  is largely  independent  across  the  two
sub-periods. This raises  questions  as to the  value  of selecting  so long a
period  for  cross-section  analysis,  especially  given  the  size  of the  mid-point
structural  shift  noted  above. However,  some  averaging  is  necessary  to bring
out longer-run  relationships.
Another  point in  considering  cross-section  analyses  is  how to
interpret  results  when some  variables,  such  as the  real  money  stock,  adjust  to
equilibrium  values  over a  number  of years. A country  which  successfully
stabilizes  very high inflation  (such  as Indonesia  after  1967)  might  have a low
average  ratio  of money  to  GDP for  a considerable  time  because  of a very low
starting  point;  conversely,  it  might  take  some time  for  the impact  of
shrinking  financial  balances  to  be reflected  in  an average  measure  for  a
country  with an initially  deep financial  system.
There  seems  to  be no simple  answer  of how long  sub-periods  should
be for  an exercise  of the  present  type,  but the  magnitude  of the  decline  in
IOCRs  after  1973  does  argue  for  splitting  the  period. Regressions  have  been
run  for  both a  pooled  set  of sub-period  averages  (that  is,  two  observations
for  each  country)  and  for the  overall  period  averages. All regressions  for
the  pooled  sub-period  averages  include  a time-shift  dummy,  GROUP,  which is
zero  for 1965-73  and  1 for  1974-85.
As in Hanson  and  Neal,  1987,  the  inflation  rate,  INF,  is a
significant  determinant  of  nominal  and  real interest  rates,  RN and  RR
respectively,  but the  linear  relationship  is less  strong  than  might  be
expected:  for the  pooled  sample  over  the two  sub-periods:
RR - 1.08  - .071  INF  - .024  GROUP  RsqAdj  - .15  (1)
(29.3)  (-5.53)  (-1.076)
T-values  are shown  in  brackets  below  coefficients.
20 Letting  RRE  and  RRL  be the  early  and late-period  real interest  rates:
RRL -0.537  + 0.410  RRE  RsqAdj  - 0.088
(2.7)  (2.0)18
Do interest  rates  ever  exceed  growth  rates? Figure  4 shows  a
scattergram  of 1965-85  averages  of output  growth  and  real interest  rates.  For
this  period,  average  interest  rates  are  below  growth  rates  for  all countries.
However,  over  shorter  periods  averaged  interest  rates  exceed  averaged  growth
rates  in a few  cases. One such  case is  Chile:  in 1974-85,  a period  marked  by
massive  financial  crisis  and  costly  debt  relief,  interest  rates  averaged  4.5%
and  growth  only  2.5%.  Chile  seems  to  have been  on the  right  hand side  of A in
Figure  1 in this  period. But growth  rates  for  the  slowest-growing  countries
are  well below  the  average  real  interest  rates  which  are sustained  in the
fastest  growing  countries. Unless  liberalizing  interest  rates  is itself
assumed  to sharply  raise  the  growth  rate,  attempts  to  hold interest  rates  at
world  market  levels  in the  sloqest  growers  or in  countries  experiencing  growth
crises  could  therefore  result  in  periodic  episodes  during  which  their
governments  seek  to  write  down the  real  value  of debt to restore  profits. 21
Figure  4 suggests  that  real interest  rates  and  growth  rates  are
quite  strongly  correlated. Table  2  shows  the  pattern  of cross-correlation
between  average  growth  rates  (DYY)  RR,  RFSTS,  IOCR  and the  investment  rate,
IGDP  pooling  the  averages  over  the two  sub-periods.  All coefficients  are
positive  and  significant  at the  5% level  except  those  between  IGDP  and RFSTS
and IGDP  and IOCR  which  are  not (and  were not  expected  to  be) significantly
different  from  zero;  the  relationship  between  RR and IGDP  is also  not
significant  at the  5% level.
21  An example  of such  a strategy  was  Brazil  in 1982-83. As output  fell  and the
country  entered  severe  recession,  monetary  correction  was  held below  inflation
and  real interest  rates  fell  on a wide spectrum  of financial  assets  and loans.
Together  with measures  to insulate  the private  sector  from losses  on foreign
exchange denominated  debts, this policy allowed private firms to markedly
strengthen  their  balance  sheets  over 1981-84.19
Table  2
Correlation  Table
(Correlation  Coefficients/  Prob  >  R  under  HO:  Rho-O)
RR  RFSTS  DYY  IOCR  IGDP
RR  1.0000
0.0000
RFSTS  0.5196  1.0000
0.0001  0.0000
DYY  0.6193  0.5668  1.0000
0.0001  0.0001  0.0000
IOCR  0.6175  0.3714  0.8249  1.0000
0.0001  0.0020  0.0001  0.0000
IGDP  0.2130  0.1916  0.2997  -0.1223  1.0000
0.0812  0.1203  0.0130  0.3203  0.0000
4.2  Cross-Countrv  Regressions.
4.2.1  Interest  Rates.  Growth  and  Efficiency
The first  question  is the  relationship  between  interest  rates  and
growth,  and  whether  this is effected  more through  investment  effects  (that  is,
changes  in the  relationship  of investment  to  GDP)  or efficiency  effects  (as
indicated  by the  incremental  output  capital  ratio  or IOCR). A range  of
regressions  has  been run  on the  overall  averages  and  on the  pooled  set  of
two-period  averages,  for  a set of  "models"  which  progress  from  the simplest
relationships  to  more complex  ones.  The  latter  include,  as additional
explanatory  variables,  CDP  per  head (GDPPE),  inflation  (INF),  and  population
growth  (POPGP). All pooled-sample  regressions  include  the  post 1973  shift
dummy,  GROUP.  In some,  the index  of volatility  was included. 22
22  Following  IMF,  1983,  some  regressions  were  also  run  using  interest  rate  ranges,
with  countries  divided  into  three  groups:  interest  rates  positive,  negative  but
more than  -5%  and less  than  -5%,  but  these  did  not  add  more to the  analysis  and
will  not be discussed  further. Volatility  usually  entered  with the "expected"
sign,  but was  not significant.20
Interest  rates  are  indeed  well-correlated  with  growth.  For  the
overall  period  and  the  pooled  set  of  averages  respectively:
DYY  - c  +  .256  RR  RsqAdj  - .489  (2)
(5.72)
DYY  - c  +  .197  RR  - .018  GROUP  RsqAdj  - .464  (3)
(5.96)  (-3.47)
and  these  results  are  robust  as  other  variables  are  included  on  the  right  hand
side. Regressions  shown  below  will  be  mainly  for  the  pooled  sub-period
averages.
Interest  rates  are  also  a  significant  explanator  of  the  IOCR:
IOCR  - c  +  .989  RR -. 139  GROUP  RsqAdj  - .563  (4)
(5.90)  (-5.39)
As  the  model  for  this  relationship  is  made  more  complex  the  coefficient  on  RR
tends,  if  anything,  to  increase.  For  the  investment  rate,  results  are  far
weaker  and  are  also  less  stable:
IGDP -c  +  .248  RR  +  .042  GROUP  RsqAdj  - .090  (5)
(2.21)  (2.43)
As this  relationship  is  expanded  to  include  more  variables  on  the  right  hand
side,  the coefficient  of  RR falls  and  it  loses  significance.
We  can  now  begin  to  assess  the  relative  strengths  of  the  efficiency
and  investment  effects  in  "explaining"  the  growth  rate. Since,  by
construction,  DYY  - IOCR.IGDP,  to  a  first  approximation:
d(DYY)/d(RR)  - d(IOCR)/d(RR).IGDP  +  d(IGDP)/d(RR).IOCR
where  underlined  variables  are  cross-country  averages.  The  results  differ
depending  on  whether  a  simple  model  or  the  more  complex  ones  are  used,  because
the  coefficients  on  RR  in  equations  (4)  and  (5)  change  as  additional  variables
are  added  on  the  right  hand  side  of  the  equations. 23 The  results  of  simple
and  more  complex  models,  estimated  over  the  period  1965-85  and  over  the  two
pooled  sub-periods  are  summarized  in  Table  3. In  the  simplest  model  estimated
over  the  overall  period,  the  efficiency  effect  is  over  twice  as  large  as  the
23 The  purpose  here is  not to  estimate  a specific  investment  or efficiency
function,  but  assess  the  relationship  between  RR  and  the  dependent  variables  and
its  robustness.  Therefore  a  range  of  possible  independent  variables  (or  "models")
has  been  used.21
investment  effect,  and  as  additional  independent  variables  are  introduced  on
the  right  hand  side  of  the  equations  the  former  rises  more  and  the  latter
falls.  The  results  for  the  pooled  subperiod  averages  are  quite  similar,  and
also  the  investment  effect  loses  significance. 24
TABLE  3
EFFICIENCY EFFECTS AND INVESTMENT  EFECTS
dYY/  dIOCR  Efficiency  dIGDP  Investment
dRR  dRR  Effect  dRR  Effect
Overall  Period
1965-85
Simple  Model 2'  .26*  .96*  .22  .39*  .09
Complex  Model 26 .26*  .1.21*  .28  .24  .05
Pooled  Periods
1965-73,74-1985  _
Simple  Model  .20*  .99*  .22  .25*  .06
Complex  Model  .19*  1.11*  .25  .17  .04
*  Significant  coefficient  at  5%  level.
We  may  conclude  that  most  of  the  estimated  rela:ionship  between
growth  and  interest  rates  is  effected  through  the  output-investment  component,
and  that,  once  the  influence  of  other  variables,  notably  the  level  of  income
per  head,  is  taken  into  account,  interest  rates  have  little  relationship  with
the  overall  rate  of  investment. 27
24  It  will  be  seen  that  the  sum  of  the  investment  and  efficiency  effects  exceeds
the  total  effect  of  RR  on DYY.  This  is  because  of the  negative  correlation
between  IOCR  and  IGDP  which  is  evident  in  Table  2.  The  weakening  of  the  investment
effect  is  mainly  due  to  the  inclusion  of  GDP  per  head  as  an  explanatory  variable.
25  Simple  Model  - right  hand  side  variables  - RR and  shift
group  for  pooled  regression.
26 Complex  Model  - right  hand  side  variables  - RR,  INF,  POPGP
GNPPE.
27  Balassa,  1989,  reviews  evidence  on the  relationship  between  interest  rates
and  saving.22
4.2.2  Inteat  tea  And  _ther  nimtnrtiona
There is the  possibility  that  an observed  relationship  between
interest  rates  and growth  merely  reflects  the  effect  of other  policies  which
are  correlated  with financial  market  policies. It  could  be expected  that
countries  with tight  controls  oni  interest  rates  and  high inflation  might  also
have tight,  import-biased  trade  restrictions  and  other  distortionary  policies.
Twenty  three  countries  are  common  to the  present  sample  and that  of Agarwala,
1983,  which  specified  distortion  indices  for  a range  of policies. For these
countries,  a  modified  distortion  index,  ODI,  was formed  from  Agarwala's  data,
by subtracting  from  his aggregate  distortion  index,  DI, the  component  due to
interest  rates,  RI.  The results  of including  ODI together  with  RR in the
regression  for the  second  sub-period  are:
DYY - c + .192  RR  RsqAdj  - .423  (6)
(4.23)
DYY  - c + .139  RR -. 019  ODI  RsqAdj  - .493  (7)
(2.78) (-2.00)
The inclusion  of ODI  does  not raise  the  overall  explanatory  power  much,  but it
does reduce  the  coefficient  of RR.  There  may therefore  be something  in the
suggestion  that  part  of the  coefficient  of RR in simple  equations  really
reflects  other  policies,  but these  do not  dominate  the  regression  and a strong
relationship  with interest  rates  remains. The  weakness  of the  relationship
between  interest  rates  and  growth  found  in  Agarwala's  study  appears  to have
been due  to the  loss  of information  caused  by uneven  country  grouping  into
ranges.
4.2.3  Financialization and Efficiency
The  next stei ls  to specify  and  estimate  a "causal  chain",  defined
as a set  of structural  equations  with  more  plausible  one-way  causality. One
such  chain  consists  of two  hypotheses:
1) the  degree  to which  savings  flows  are intermediated  through  the  financial
system  is related  to the  real  rate  of return  available  on financial  assets;23
2) the  efficiency  of investment,  and the  growth  rate,  are  related  to the
degree  of savings  intermediation  rather  than  just to the  level  of saving.
The first  relationship  departs  from the  portfolio  choice  of savers,  who can
choose  to accumulate  real  wealth  in the  form  of financial  or real assets.
There is  no obvious  theory  to explain  reverse  causality. Indeed,  a strong
propensity  to save in financial  asset  form  should,  if  anything,  reduce  returns
on financial  assets  by expanding  the  supply  of loanable  funds. There  is also
no obvious  reason  for the  degree  of savings  intermediation  to depend  on the
growth  rate  or IOCR.  Although,  as discussed  above,  returns  on assets  could  be
expected  to  be higher  in fast-growing  economies,  this  would  apply  to  AU1
assets  (including  land)  and  not only  to those  held in  financial  form.  It is
true  that the  ratio  of monetary  aggregates  to  GDP rises  with  higher  income  per
head,  but so does the  rate  of savings,  so that  the  degree  to  which  the latter
are financialised  does  not  obviously  depend  on income  levels. 28 Estimates
derived  from  chaining  these  relationships  will therefore  be more likely  to
indicate  a causal  relationship  between  interest  rates  and  growth  than  a
simple,  one-stage  regression.
The degree  of savings  intermediation,  RFSTS,  is defined  as:
RFSTS  - Real increase  in  M3/Gross  domestic  savings
where the  numerator  and  denominator  are  deflated  to allow  for  the  fact that
savings  is a flow  at average-year  prices  and  monetary  aggregates  are  measured
at end-years. 29 In each  period  the  economy  is seen  as setting  aside  a
certain  part of its  total  resources  as savings. Part  of this is  used to
invest  directly  in real  owned  assets  (i.e.,  equity  built  up through  retained
earnings),  and part is  used to  build  up real financial  assets. RFSTS  measures
the  ratio  between  these. Averaged  over the  entire  period,  it ranges  in value
28  Such theories  could  be constructed. For  example,  fast-growing  countries  are
likely  to have a larger  component  of transient  income  than slow-growing  ones,
and  savings  out  of  transient  income  might  be  attracted  to  financial  assets  because
of their greater liquidity.  Transient  components  should  be quite small in
averaged  data as used  here.
29  The  average-year  price  deflator  p  of  the  savings  flow  S  during  year  t  is  taken
to be the arithmetic  average  of the initial  and end-year  prices,  Pt-i  and pt.
Then,
RFSTS - [  M3t/p,  - M3t_ 1/pt  l /[  S/R  ].
If  the  real  savings  flow  and  real  money  accumulation  are  constant  within  periods,
this  measure  is invariant  to inflation.24
from  0.45 (for  the  most rapidly  monetising  economy)  to -0.18  (for  a rapidly
demonetising  economy  with low  savings  rates). For  the  average  country,  14%  of
the  savings  flow is financialized  as measured  here.
Using the  pooled  set  of averages  over 1965-73  and  1974-85,  some
equations  for  the  two  hypotheses  are:
RFSTS  - c  +  .817  RR  RsqAdj  - .259
(4.90)  (8)
RFSTS  - c +  .694  RR -.150  TSGD -. 044 INF  +.00003  GNPPE  -.031  GROUP
(3.82)  (-1.02)  (-1.27)  (1.29)  (-1.13)
RsqAdj  - .271  (9)
DYY  - c +  .113  RFSTS  +  .058  TSGD  -. 019  GROUP
(4.98)  (2.026)  (-3.46)
RsqAdj  - .430  (10)
IOCR  - c +  .280  RFSTS  -. 098  TSGD - .160  GROUP
(2.17)  (-.61)  (-5.21)
RsqAdj  - .367  (11)
From  equations  (8)  and (9),  the  rate  of savings  intermediation,
RFSTS,  does respond  to real interest  rates,  but the  ratio  of total  savings  to
GDP,  TSGD, inflation,  and  the level  of GDP per  head  are  not significant. This
is  especially  surprising  for inflation  considering  the  large  Ml component  in
broad  money in  most developing  countries. The  reason  seems  to  be that  only
some  of the low-inflation  countries  succeed  in increasing  financial  depth,
while  in the  higher  inflation  countries  financial  balances  have usually
already  been drawn  down  to minimum  levels  so that the  degree  of further
intermediation  is zero  rather  than  strongly  negative  (note  that  RFSTS  measures
incremental  financial  deepening  not financial  depth).  Equat:ons  (10)  and
(11)  suggest  that  the  rate  of savings  intermediation  influences  the  efficiency
effect  and, indeed,  that  it is more important  than the  volume  of domestic
savings  in determining  the  growth  rate.  These  results  seem to  be fairly
stable  to the inclusion  or exclusion  of other  variables.
If  we express  growth  as a function  of savings  intermediation  (a
proxy for  efficiency  or the  IOCR)  and  other  variables  and then  express
intermediation  itself  as a function  of the  real interest  rate  and other
variables:
DYY (  RFSTS (  RR,.)  ......
From the  regression  coefficients,25
d(DYY)/d(RR)  - d(DYY)/d(RFSTS).d(RFSTS)/d(RR)  - 0.08.
Therefore,  these  regressions  suggest  that  a  rise  in  the  real  interest  rate  of
one  percentage  point  will  translate,  through  an  increase  in  the  intermediation
of  savings  of  about  0.7  percentage  points,  into  an  increase  of  somewhat  under
one  tenth  of  a  percent  in  the  growth  rate. This  is  about  40  percent  of  the
increase  suggested  by  the  coefficients  of  the  equations  between  growth  and  the
real  interest  rate  estimated  previously.  Much  of  the  previous  relationship
may  therefore.be  due  to  reverse  causality  (from  growth  to  interest  rates),  but
the  causal  effect  from  real  rates  to  growth  is  still  considerable,  and
indicates  an  important  role  for  financial  sector  policy  in  the  growth  process.
In  Table  ld,  the  growth  difference  between  the  high  and  low  growth  countries
was  3  percentage  points  and  the  average  interest  rate  difference  was  6
percentage  points;  the  latter  might  therefore  have  accounted  for  about  0.5
percentage  points  of  the  growth  rate  difference.  Over  21  years  this  is  not
negligible.
4.2.4 Financial  Depth  and  Growth
Another  indication  of  the  influence  of  the  financial  sector  on
growth  could  be  provided  by  using  the  ratio  of  broad  money  to  GDP  (M3GDP)  and
its  determinants  as  explanatory  variables. 30 As  noted  above,  the  average  of
M3GDP  over  a  period  reflects  the  initial  conditions  as  well  as  policies  during
the  period,  and  thus  could  relate  more  to  average  productivity  than  to
incremental  productivity  and  growth  during  the  period.  M3GDP  does  appear  to  be
related  to  growth  rates,  but  it  does  not  seem  to  weaken  the  association
between  interest  rates  and  growth:
DYY  - c +  .180  RR +  .034  M3GDP  - .021  GROUP  RsqAdj  - .486  (12)
(5.22)  (2.13)  (-3.91)
Real  interest  rates  are  a  significant  eyplanator  of  M3GDP,  but  lose
significance  once  inflation  is  included  in  an  equation:
M3GDP  - c.  +  .251  RR  +  .0002  GNPPE  -. 141  INF  +.099  GROUP  (13)
(1.13)  (5.92)  (-3.36)  (3.31)  RsqAdj  - .416
Equation  (13)  confirms  the  conclusion  of  Hanson  and  Neal  that  inflation  has
had  a  stronger  influence  on  the  level  of  monetisation  than  has  the  interest
rate  regime.  At  the  same  time,  it  seems  that  interest  rates  relate  to  growth
independently  of  their  effect  on  financial  depth,  and  it  was  shown  above  that
including  inflation  did  not  influence  their  impact  on  the  financialization  of
savings  flows.  There  is  room  for  further  research  in  these  areas.
30  M3GDP  is  computed  as the  average  of  M3  at  the  start  and  at  the  end  of the
year  divided  by  the  GDP  flow  during  the  year.26
4.2.5  Tntarest  Rates  and the  Current  Account
Finally  we note the results  of regressions  for  the  current  account.
With  interest  rates  mainly  demand-driven,  the  more rapidly  growing  countries
with  higher  returns  on investment  and  higher  real  rates  would  be expected  to
attract  foreign  savings  and so  be able to run  larger  current  account  deficits.
On the  other  hand,  countries  with "regulation-driven"  interest  rates  held at
well below  market-clearing  levels  might  become  more dependent  on inflows  of
foreign  funds  to supplement  shrunken  volumes  of domestic  loanable  funds.
The regressions  above  suggest  that  observed  interest  rate levels
reflect  a mixture  of these  two  effects. It is therefore  not too  surprising
that there  seems  to be little  systematic  cross-country  relationship  betwee,;
interest  rate levels  and  the  current  account.
4.2.6  Growth  and  Stock  Market  Performance
A number  of developing  countries  have encouraged  the  development  of
equity  markets. These  markets  are  typically  thin (with  some  exceptions;  in
relation  to GDP the  equity  market  of  Malaysia  is  deeper  than that  of most
developed  economies). They  are  also usually  very  volatile,  both  because  of
more  volatile  macroeconomies  and  because  of generally  weaker  information  and
prudential  regulation. .'he  questicn  of  whether  the  performance  of stock
markets  relates  systematically  to  macroeconomic  variables  or  whether  they are
simply  "casinos"  is important  for  understanding  the role  of equities  in
absorbing  risk in  developing  countries. The reverse  question,  whether  the
possession  and  performance  of a stock  market  influences  economic  performance,
is  beyond  the  present  scope.31
An extensive  test  of the  characteristics  of developing  country
stock  markets  is outside  the  scope  of this  paper.  However,  three  simple
questions  may  be addressed:
1) Do equity  markets  offer  a hedge  against  inflation?
2) Does  market  performance,  in terms  of real  appreciation  of the  stock  price
index,  bear  any systematic  relationship  to rates  of economic  growth?
3) Is there  evidence  that  buoyant  equity  markets  result  from  repressing  the
rate of return  on other  financial  assets?
Annual  local  indices  of equity  prices  were obtained  for 11
developing  markets  covering  an average  of 9 years  up to 1975.  These  were
deflated  by the  price index  to  obtain  RINC,  the  real increase  in  equity  prices
31 The role of the  equity  market  in raising  resources  for investment  is still
negligible  in  most  developing  countries. For  this  reason,  this  study  discounts
the  possibility  of a strong  causal  link  from  the  stock  price  index  to growth.27
over  8 years. 32 RINC represents  a minimum  yield  on the  corresponding
portfolio  of stocks,  in that  dividend  payments  are  not included. The 11
countries  encompass  a wide range  of inflation  and  growth  experiences.
As would  be expected,  the  distribution  of RINC is  positively
skewed,  and  approximately  loglinear. While  there  are  more cases  of negative
values  of RINC,  its  average  across  countries  and  over time is 1.06  and its
standard  deviation  is  0.43.  There  is thus  a  very  wide dispersion  in annual
real  returns  to  holding  equity  but, unlike  interest-bearing  deposits,  equity
appears  to be,  on average,  a satisfactory  hedge  against  inflation.
The relationship  between  growth,  real interest  rates,  inflation  and
RINC  may be summarized  in the  following  equation,  which is estimated  on the
pooled  sample  of annual  data for  all  countries:
RINC  - c +  3.84  DYY +  1.25  RR +  0.19  INF
(4.6)  (2.7)  (3.5)  RsqAdj  - 0.24.
The  degree  of explanatory  power  of this  equation  is  not  high,  but it  suggests
some  relationship  between  growth  rates  and  the  performance  of real  equity
prices.  It also  suggests  that  equity  prices  relate  positively,  rather  than
negatively,  to the levels  of real interest  rates  and to inflation.
Another  test  of the  growth-stock  index  relationship  is  provided  by
the  distribution  of the  11 regression  coefficients  estimated  for  the  set  of
countries. Eight  are  positive  (four  significant  at 5% level)  and three
negative  (one  at 5% level). Finally,  a scattergram  of RINC against  DYY  has
the  following  distribution:
Table  4
Dintribution  of  RTNC  versus  DnY
No.  of Observations  DYY
Negative  Positive
RINC  Positive  338
Negative  15  32
32  The markets  are those  of:  Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,  India,  Korea,  Mexico,
Philippines,  Pakistan,  Thailand,  Taiwan  and  Venezuela28
ChiSquare  (1)  - 8.1,  significant  at  0.01.
These  results  are  very  preliminary.  There  is  need  for  further
research  on  the  performance  of  equity  m3rkets  in  developing  countries,  and  its
determinants  and  impact.
5.  Ccnfaa±ln
This  study  has  used  simple  cross-country  regressions  to  address  the
relationships  between  financial  policies  and  growth.  For  several  reasons,
notably  the  poor  proxies  for  financial  policy  (financial  depth  and  interest
rates),  the  diffused  nature  of  any  relationship,  and  reverse  causality,  these
effects  are  difficult  to  isolate  with  confidence.  With  this  caveat,  the
results  of  this  study  support  the  following  propositions:
Despite  their  supposed  status  as  capital-short  countries,  interest  rates  in
developing  countries  have,  on  average,  fallen  below  dollar  rates,  especially
after  1973. This  suggests  a  serious  and  widespread  problem  of  mispricing
financial  savings.
Real  interest  rates  and  growth  are  associated  positively,  within  the
historical  experience  of  the  sample;
Most  of  this  association  relates  to  the  efficiency  effect  (as  measured  by the
IOCR)  rather  than  the  level  of  investment:  the  latter  relates  only  weakly  to
interest  rates;
Much  of  the  interest-rate/growth  relationship  reflects  reverse  causality,  from
growth  and  efficiency  to  higher  yields  on  all  assets  to  higher  interest  rates.
But  at  least  part  reflects  the  causal  chain  from  interest  rate  levels  to
growth  rates  via  the  degree  of  financialization  of  savings.
The  observed  interest-rate/growth  relationship  may  partly  reflect  the
influence  of  other,  related,  distortionary  policies,  but  the  former  is  still
powerful  when  the  latter  are  included.
Financial  depth  does  explain  part  of  cross-country  variation  in  growth  rates
but  does  not  weaken  the  interest-rate  growth  association.
There  is  little  relationship  between  interest  rate  levels  and  the  current
account.
A  very  preliminary  analysis  suggests  that  equity  market  performance  in
developing  countries  relates  systematically  and  positively  to  growth  rates,
and  that  interest  rate  repression  is  not  a  cause  of  increases  in  stock  prices.29
These  results  therefore  argue  in  favor  of  liberalized  financial
markets,  or  at  least  against  policies  which  severely  repress  finance.  This  is
not  to  say,  of  course,  that  abrupt  liberalization  is  desirable,  or  that
certain  interventions  which  act  to  compensate  for  observed  deficiencies  in
financial  markets  may  not  be  beneficial,  at  least  until  measures  to  improve
information,  prudential  supervision  and  regulation  and  macro-stability  are
effective.30
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